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No Competition: How Radio 
Consolidation Has Diminished 
Diversity and Sacrificed Localism 
Gregory M. Prindle∗ 
 
The great cacophony of different sounds and voices  
is being amalgamated and homogenized.1 
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1 William Safire, On Media Giantism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A19 (arguing that 
“media mergers have narrowed the range of information and entertainment available to 
people of all ideologies”). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Communications Act of 19342 empowered the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) to issue licenses and enact 
regulations in accordance with the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity.”3  Subsequently, the FCC and federal courts interpreted 
the “public interest” standard as requiring the promotion of 
competition, diversity, and localism in the radio marketplace.4  
While these three goals have remained unchanged, the means of 
trying to achieve them has evolved.  The rise and fall of radio 
ownership restrictions reflect these changing views. 
The FCC began placing restrictions on radio ownership soon 
after the Communications Act of 1934 in order to promote 
diversity and protect against anti-competitive behavior that may 
 
2 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615 (2000)). 
3 47 U.S.C. § 303. 
4 See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (accepting the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC) determination that the principles of competition 
and localism fall within the scope of “public interest”); see also Fed. Communications 
Comm’n [FCC] v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (holding 
that the “public interest” standard encompasses the goal of providing the “widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources” (quoting AP v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)); infra notes 63–89 and accompanying text. 
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accompany large-scale consolidation.5  Likewise, the FCC cited 
goals of promoting diversity and furthering competition when it 
started loosening these very restrictions in the 1980s.6  This 
apparent contradiction reflects a transformation in the philosophy 
of the FCC from the theory that competition, diversity, and 
localism are best protected through regulation, to the marketplace 
theory.7  The marketplace theory suggests that deregulation spurs 
more competition for listeners, thereby promoting the audience 
interests of diversity and localism.8 
The pinnacle of the marketplace theory and deregulation is 
embodied in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,9 which severely 
loosened local ownership restrictions and completely eliminated 
the national ownership cap.10  Now, a single entity may own up to 
eight stations in the largest markets and an unlimited amount 
nationwide.11  As a result of these relaxed ownership restrictions, 
the radio industry consolidated rapidly.12 
 
5 See Michael J. Aguilar, Note, Micro Radio: A Small Step in The Return to Localism, 
Diversity, and Competitiveness in Broadcasting, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1133, 1158 (1999) 
(suggesting that the licensing of micro-radio stations could compensate for the recent 
move away from localism, diversity, and competition).  Initially, a person or entity with a 
broadcasting license was prohibited from obtaining another license in the same broadcast 
service, unless the applicant could demonstrate that the issuance would advance 
competition and not result in concentration of control harmful to the public interest. Id.  
In 1940, the FCC began setting absolute limits, restricting common ownership of FM 
radio stations to six. Id.  The FCC created national and local ownership restrictions in 
order to “promote diversity of ownership . . . and to safeguard against the undue 
concentration of economic power.” Id. (quoting Henry Geller, Ownership Regulatory 
Policies in the U.S. Telecom Sectors, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 727, 729 (1995)). 
6 See Benjamin J. Bates & Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis for Radio 
Deregulation, 12 J. MEDIA ECONS. 19, 23 (1999) (evaluating the theories behind the trend 
toward deregulation). 
7 See id.; see also infra notes 121–124 and accompanying text. 
8 Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23. 
9 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). 
10 47 U.S.C. § 202(a). 
11 Id. 
12 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 29.  For example, from March 1996 to 
March 2002, the number of radio stations nationwide increased 5.4 percent, while the 
number of owners decreased 33.6 percent. George Williams & Scott Roberts, Radio 
Industry Review 2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and Finance, FCC, at 
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003); see also infra 
notes 180–96 and accompanying text. 
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While the Telecommunications Act’s deregulation of 
ownership restrictions undoubtedly caused this large-scale 
consolidation, there is debate as to whether consolidation furthers 
or restricts the public interest goals of promoting competition, 
diversity, and localism.13  Critics of deregulation charge that 
consolidation of radio ownership has resulted in a less competitive 
marketplace, where diversity and localism suffer.14  On the other 
hand, proponents maintain that consolidation allows for 
operational efficiency and produces a superior, more diverse 
product for listeners without harming competition.15 
The debate over deregulation and resulting consolidation is 
reviewed by the FCC every two years as required by the 
Telecommunications Act.16  In the review, the FCC must 
determine “whether any of such rules are necessary in the public 
interest as a result of competition.”17  In September 2002, the FCC 
initiated its third biennial review of its media ownership rules.18  
As a result, on June 2, 2003, the FCC proposed further relaxation 
of media ownership restrictions while leaving radio ownership 
rules virtually unchanged.19 
 
13 With the passage of the Telecommunications Act, the debate has moved out of 
economic theory and into economic reality. See infra Part III. 
14 Among the most vocal critics is the Future of Music Coalition, which produced a 
scathing critique of the industry as moving away from the goals of localism, diversity, 
and competition. See FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, RADIO DEREGULATION: HAS IT 
SERVED CITIZENS AND MUSICIANS? 24 (2002), available at 
http://www.futureofmusic.org/research/radiostudy.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003); see 
also infra Part III. 
15 For example, money saved through operational efficiencies has led to new and 
innovative products like voice-tracking, which allows big-city disc jockey talent to reach 
smaller markets that otherwise would not be able to afford it. See Jeff Leeds, Clear 
Channel: An Empire Built on Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at B1; see also 
infra notes 150–64 and accompanying text. 
16 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h). 
17 Id. 
18 See Press Release, FCC, FCC Initiates Third Biennial Review of Broadcast 
Ownership Rules (Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter FCC Press Release], available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226188A1.doc (last visited Nov. 
13, 2003). 
19 Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Statutes of 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003).  The FCC’s decision 
faced immediate opposition in Congress and the imposition of the new rules was stayed 
by a federal court order.  This overwhelming response—as well as the FCC’s decision to 
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As part of the review process, the FCC adopted a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (“Notice”) on September 12, 2002.20  In the 
Notice, the FCC affirmed its traditional goals of promoting the 
three principles of public interest: competition, diversity, and 
localism in the local media market.21  The FCC investigated 
whether (1) the marketplace provided a sufficient level of 
competition to protect and advance the above policy goals; (2) the 
current ownership rules achieved these goals; and (3) the revisions 
to the rules were required to protect and advance competition, 
diversity, and localism in the media market.22 
Part I of this Note discusses the early days of radio and the 
need for regulation, including the creation of the FCC and the 
passing of the Communications Act of 1934.  It then examines the 
interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934’s public interest 
standard as encouraging competition, diversity, and localism 
through radio ownership restrictions.  Part II observes how the 
marketplace theory and the benefits of economies of scale and 
scope led the FCC and Congress to move from favoring regulation 
to viewing deregulation as the best means to promote these three 
public interest principles, culminating in the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.  Part III examines the resulting consolidation of radio 
ownership and explores how deregulation of ownership restrictions 
impedes the “public interests” of competition, diversity, and 
localism in the radio marketplace.  Part IV concludes that the 
current radio marketplace does not provide sufficient competition 
to protect and advance the goals of diversity and localism.  It 
advocates that the FCC retain local ownership restrictions and re-
evaluate a national ownership cap, as well as calls upon Congress 
to curb current anti-competitive behavior. 
 
avoid further radio deregulation—is likely the direct result of deregulation’s adverse 
effect on the radio industry. See infra notes 166–76. 
20 See FCC Press Release, supra note 18. 
21 See id. 
22 See id.  The FCC chairman, Michael Powell, reportedly likes to say, “The market is 
my religion.” Safire, supra note 1. 
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I. REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD 
A. Early Radio and Regulation 
Radio began as little more than a utilitarian device, functioning 
primarily to increase safety on ships and as a tool for government 
and businesses to transmit information more efficiently.23  The first 
federal regulation of radio emphasized its utility as a safety device, 
requiring certain ocean-going vessels be equipped with radio 
equipment managed by a skilled operator, so that the operator 
would be able to promptly notify persons on shore and in other 
nearby vessels if an emergency arose.24  In addition, radio enabled 
U.S. Navy personnel to coordinate entire fleets and receive 
weather reports and storm warnings.25  Radio also gave some 
businesses a competitive advantage by allowing them to operate 
more efficiently.26  For example, rather than having its ships stop 
in ports to pick up telegraph messages, the United Fruit Company 
used radio to direct its ships to the best markets.27 
Government and business use of radio, however, soon 
conflicted with amateur radio operators, who interfered with 
official broadcasts and crowded out naval and business 
communications.28  A few agitators even posed as admirals and 
issued phony orders to naval ships.29 
In response, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1912, 
forbidding radio broadcast without a license and giving the 
 
23 Michael Ortner, Note, Serving a Different Master—The Decline of Diversity and the 
Public Interest in American Radio in the Wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 139, 140 (2000). 
24 Wireless Ship Act of June 14, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629 (1910) 
(codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 484–87) (repealed 1934). 
25 ANN E. WEISS, TUNE IN, TUNE OUT: BROADCASTING REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 12 (1981) (“It did not take navy officers long to see how useful it would be to 
have ships linked to each other, and to shore, by wireless.”). 
26 See id. 
27 Id. (“Thanks to radio, they could receive that information while at sea.  This gave 
them an edge over competitors, and helped boost United Fruit profits.”). 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  “Government officials soon made up their minds that such frivolous uses of radio 
must be stopped, and in 1912 Congress passed the nation’s first radio law,” the Radio Act 
of 1912. Id. 
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Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor the power to 
determine who could broadcast on specific frequencies at specific 
times.30  The statute also allocated certain frequencies for exclusive 
government use.31  Although nearly 9,000 Americans had 
broadcast licenses by 1917,32 interference was rare because there 
were more than enough frequencies for all the stations then in 
existence.33 
World War I accelerated the development of radio.34  The early 
1920s brought the first standard broadcasting stations with 
scheduled programming.35  By 1923, several hundred stations were 
broadcasting across the country,36 and in 1924 Americans spent 
$358 million on radio sets and parts.37  To deal with the rapid 
growth in radio stations and resulting frequency interference, 
“then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover called for a series of 
national radio conferences.”38  In each year of the early 1920s the 
industry called for the government to step in.39  In May of 1923, 
Hoover announced a major reallocation of radio frequencies.40  
 
30 Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).  This statute was also largely in 
response to the Titanic disaster of April 14, 1912. See KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 52 (4th ed. 2003). 
31 Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287. 
32 WEISS, supra note 25, at 14. 
33 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 (1943). 
34 See id.  The Navy gave contracts to the Westinghouse Corp., the General Electric 
Corp. (GE), and the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) to produce radio 
parts and equipment during World War I.  Each company made vast improvements and 
obtained patents.  Westinghouse Corp., GE, and AT&T, along with the United Fruit Co., 
united to create a company to use their more than two thousand patents to their best 
advantage.  The company, later broken up by the federal government, was called the 
Radio Corp. of America (RCA). WEISS, supra note 25, at 14–15. 
35 See NBC, 319 U.S. at 211 
36 Id. 
37 WEISS, supra note 25, at 18.  The $358 million spent by Americans on radio sets and 
parts in 1924 is a significant increase from the $60 million spent on radio sets and parts in 
1920. Id. 
38 Ortner, supra note 23, at 141.  Meanwhile, both licensed and unlicensed broadcasters 
continued to broadcast any material at any time and on any wavelength, causing “the 
radio landscape [to become] so cluttered with interference and conflicting information 
that the public was fortunate to find any sustained, palatable programming.” Id. 
39 CREECH, supra note 30, at 53.  “Everyone, it seemed, conservative and liberal alike, 
was extolling the need for more regulation.” Ortner, supra note 23, at 142. 
40 NBC, 319 U.S. at 211.  Herbert Hoover’s decision was based on the recommendation 
of the National Radio Conferences. Id. 
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Hoover divided the frequencies into three classes and assigned 
them to particular stations.41  The third class of frequencies 
included stations that served small local areas, were on the same 
spot on the dial, and had to share time.42  The second class 
included stations that were a little larger and had to share time and 
frequencies as necessary.43  The first class of frequencies carried 
little interference, broadcast over wide areas, and had almost no 
time-sharing.44  This most powerful class of radio stations was 
called “clear channels.”45 
These measures proved insufficient in the face of the 
astonishing development of radio.46  At the Third National Radio 
Conference in 1924, Hoover responded to the radio industry’s calls 
for regulation by noting that radio “is probably the only industry of 
the United States that is unanimously in favor of having itself 
regulated.”47  More than 400 broadcasters attended the final 
National Radio Conference in November of 1925.48  They opposed 
accommodating new stations through extending the standard 
broadcast band at the expense of other types of services or by 
imposing greater limitations on time and power, and instead called 
upon Congress to find a legislative solution.49 
 
41 WEISS, supra note 25, at 27. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  Appropriately, the most powerful radio owner is named Clear Channel 
Communications, with over 1,200 radio stations, the nation’s largest live-concert 
promotions firm, 19 television stations and 770,000 billboards. Leeds, supra note 15. 
46 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943).  Every channel in the standard 
broadcast band was occupied by at least one station, and there were 175 applications for 
new stations. Id.  In order to accommodate the new stations, Hoover could either extend 
the standard broadcast band at the expense of other services or impose even greater 
limitations on time and power. Id. 
47 ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST 
REGULATION 11 (3d ed. 1982).  “The industry had come to demand such controls as the 
increase in stations continued unchecked . . . . With every channel filled in urban areas, 
most stations were experiencing considerable interference from other stations and had 
been forced to work out complex time-sharing schemes.” Id. 
48 CREECH, supra note 30, at 52. Only twenty-two broadcasters attended the First 
National Radio Conference in 1922. Id. 
49 See NBC, 319 U.S. at 211–12. 
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Hoover’s hands were tied.  In 1926, a U.S. federal court ruled 
that the Radio Act of 1912 did not give the Secretary of Commerce 
the right to allocate radio frequencies.50  The court declared all of 
Hoover’s new assignments invalid.51  Months later, Acting 
Attorney General William Donovan released an opinion stating 
that the Secretary of Commerce had no authority, under the Radio 
Act of 1912, to regulate the power, frequency, or hours of 
operation of the radio stations.52  The next day, the Secretary of 
Commerce issued a statement urging the stations to undertake self-
regulation.53  Instead of self-regulating, however, station owners 
began broadcasting wherever and whenever they pleased, resulting 
in pandemonium.54 
Amid the chaos, Congress responded to the demands of both 
courts and station owners by enacting the Radio Act of 1927.55  
The act created a “unified and comprehensive regulatory system 
for the [radio] industry.”56  The statute took radio-licensing power 
away from the Department of Commerce and gave it to a newly 
formed five-member Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”).57  The 
 
50 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (finding “no 
express grant of power in the act to the Secretary of Commerce to establish regulations”).  
Zenith Radio Corp. was licensed to operate WJAZ on a frequency of 930 kHz for only 
two hours per week, as part of Hoover’s solution to overcrowding. CREECH, supra note 
30, at 53.  Zenith then applied for a license to broadcast on 910 kHz, but—under an 
agreement between the United States and Canada—the frequency was limited to 
Canadian use. Id.  Zenith rebelliously jumped to 910 kHz without a license, prompting 
other stations to declare similar intentions. Id.  Siding with Zenith, the court found that 
the U.S. Commerce Department had no authority to establish radio regulations under the 
Radio Act of 1912. Zenith, 12 F.2d at 614. 
51 Id. at 618. 
52 35 Op. Att’y. Gen. 126, 135 (1926) (advising Hoover that “[i]f the present situation 
requires control, I can only suggest that it be sought in new legislation, carefully adapted 
to meet the needs of both the present and future”). 
53 NBC, 319 U.S. at 212. 
54 See id.  “With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.” Id. 
55 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 81–121) (repealed 1934).  Even President Calvin Coolidge had appealed to Congress 
to pass legislation that would respond to the diminishing authority of the Department of 
Commerce, noting that “the whole service of this most important public function has 
drifted into such chaos as seems likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.” NBC, 
319 U.S. at 213 (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 483, at 10 (2d Sess. 1926)). 
56 NBC, 319 U.S. at 214. 
57 Radio Act of 1927 § 3. 
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statute specifically gave the FRC the authority to assign 
frequencies and to regulate broadcasting hours, time-sharing, and 
general use of the airwaves.58  Significantly, Congress mandated 
that the standard for licensing radio stations was that the 
broadcaster’s goals served the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity” of the people in the local broadcast market.59 
Congress updated the 1927 law with the Communications Act 
of 1934.60  This statute replaced the FRC with a seven-member 
FCC and delegated regulation of both the telephone and telegraph 
industries to the FCC.61  The Communications Act of 1934 
retained the Radio Act of 1927’s requirements that: (1) stations be 
licensed by a government agency; (2) licenses be of a definite and 
temporary duration; and (3) licenses be granted in accordance with 
the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”62 
 
58 Id. § 4. 
The FRC faced virtually insuperable problems: its temporary status, with powers expiring 
after one year; the danger of internal strife, because of each Commissioner’s appointment 
from a geographical zone; the great vagueness of the act and the lack of a specific 
mandate from Congress; the slowness of Senate confirmation of the Commissioners; 
constant court challenges to its decisions; and the claim of ‘prior rights’ by stations 
already on the air. 
KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 47, at 13. 
59 Id. § 4.  The phrase “public interest, convenience, or necessity”  originated in an 
1887 Illinois railroad statute and resurfaced in the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 
Stat. 456 (1920). CREECH, supra note 30, at 55. 
60 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615 (2000)).  The objectives of the 1934 legislation remained 
substantially unchanged from the goals of the Radio Act of 1927: to regulate the use—not 
ownership—of radio frequencies in order to allow “a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and 
world-wide communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.” NBC, 
319 U.S. at 214. 
61 Communications Act of 1934 § 4.  Today, the FCC regulates television, too.  The 
FCC began formal operations on July 11, 1934. CREECH, supra note 30, at 55. 
In 1982, Congress reduced the number of members to five.  Commissioners are appointed 
by the president, confirmed by the Senate and serve five-year terms. . . . [N]o more than 
three members may be from the same political party and terms are staggered so that no 
two terms expire in the same year. . . . The chairperson of the FCC is chosen by the 
president and is responsible for setting the agenda of the FCC. 
Id. at 8. 
62 Communications Act of 1934 § 303. 
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B. Defining Public Interest: Competition, Diversity, and Localism 
Congress did not define the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity” in the Communications Act of 1934.63  Courts, however, 
have granted the FCC wide latitude in determining what is in the 
public interest.64  Courts have repeatedly held that the authority 
conferred upon the FCC by Congress supplies a statutory basis for 
the FCC to issue regulations codifying “its view of the public-
interest licensing standard.”65  The FCC’s regulations reveal the its 
view of the public interest standard to be the promotion of 
competition, diversity, and localism in the marketplace.66  Courts 
endorsed this standard by repeatedly upholding regulations as 
consistent with the statutory scheme of advancing the public 
interest, as well as establishing the concept that the public interest 
is superior to the private interests of the licensee. 
In NBC v. United States,67 the Supreme Court accepted the 
FCC’s determination that the principles of competition and 
localism fell within the scope of public interest.68  Thus, the Court 
dismissed a challenge to the FCC’s Chain Broadcasting 
Regulations, which prohibited local stations from entering into 
network affiliation contracts that resulted in the station 
surrendering control of its programming to a network.69  The FCC 
felt that the exclusive affiliation of the station impeded competition 
 
63 See id. 
64 See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953) (holding that the 
FCC is not required to make specific findings of tangible benefit when concluding that 
duplicating authorizations are not in the public interest). 
65 See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broad., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956) (sustaining 
regulations placing limits on the total number of stations a single entity could own in 
each broadcast service based on the FCC’s policy of promoting diversification of 
ownership); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978) 
(upholding regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or 
television broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community based 
on the FCC’s policy of promoting diversification of mass media). 
66 See cases cited supra note 65. 
67 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
68 Id.  “Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based 
upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted by 
Congress.  It is not for us to say that the ‘public interest’ will be furthered or retarded by 
the Chain Broadcasting Regulations.” Id. at 224. 
69 Id. 
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by hindering the growth of new networks.70  Also, the principle of 
localism—or local program service—suffered when a station 
broadcast a high percentage of its programming from a national 
network.71  Calling local program service a “vital part of 
community life,” the FCC determined that a licensee must 
maintain freedom of action to service the programming and 
advertising needs of the local community.72  The Court noted “an 
important element of public interest and convenience affecting the 
issue of a license is the ability of the licensee to render the best 
practicable service to the community reached by [its] 
broadcasts.”73  Significantly, the Court left it to the FCC to 
determine the “best practicable service,” which reflects the 
deference that most courts give to the FCC in determining how to 
serve the public interest.74 
Likewise, in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for 
Broadcasting,75 the Supreme Court resolved that the public interest 
standard encompasses the policy goal of the “widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources.”76  The Court upheld regulations governing common 
ownership of radio or television stations and newspapers in the 
same community, concluding that the FCC’s determination that 
diversification of mass media would benefit the public interest was 
consistent with the Communications Act of 1934.77 
Furthermore, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,78 the 
Supreme Court held that the FCC’s interest in enhancing broadcast 
diversity was a sufficient basis for upholding minority ownership 
policies aimed at promoting programming variety.79  According to 
 
70 Id. at 199. 
71 Id. at 203. 
72 Id. at 202. 
73 Id. at 216 (quoting FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)). 
74 Id.; see, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978); 
United States v. Storer Broad., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956); FCC v. RCA Communications, 
Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953). 
75 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
76 Id. at 785. 
77 Id. at 795. 
78 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
79 Id. at 567–68. 
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the Court, the public benefited by having access to a wider 
diversity of information sources.80  Thus, the FCC properly placed 
diversity within the scope of the public interest standard.81 
Recently, it has not been sufficient for the FCC to merely opine 
that certain regulations would promote the public interest goals of 
competition, diversity, and localism in the radio market.  In Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,82 a federal court demanded that 
the FCC illustrate valid reasons why regulations would promote 
the public interest.83  The court noted that protecting diversity 
remains a permissible policy, but observed that the FCC failed to 
demonstrate any reason why national television ownership and 
cable/broadcast cross-ownership rules would encourage 
competition and diversity.84  Thus, while the promotion of 
competition, diversity, and localism remains within the scope of 
public interest, the FCC must also show how regulations might 
actually promote these policy goals. 
As courts have sanctioned the FCC’s definition of the public 
interest standard as promoting competition, diversity, and localism 
in the radio market, courts also have reiterated the concept that the 
ownership rights of the public outweigh the licensee rights of the 
broadcaster.85  The Communications Act of 1934 provides only for 
the use of radio channels, “but not the ownership thereof.”86  
Clearly, the licensee is merely a fiduciary for the public.87  In Red 
 
80 Id. at 568.  “From its inception, public regulation of broadcasting has been premised 
on the assumption that diversification of ownership will broaden the range of 
programming available to the broadcast audience.” Id. at 570. 
81 See id. 
82 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
83 Id. at 1043. 
84 Id.  “Although we agree with the Commission that protecting diversity is a 
permissible policy, the Commission did not provide an adequate basis for believing the 
[National Television Station Ownership] Rule would in fact further that cause.” Id. 
85 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding regulations 
requiring radio stations to provide time for a response to a personal attack). 
86 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615 (2000)). 
87 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389 (“There is nothing in the First Amendment which 
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and 
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and 
voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by 
necessity, be barred from the airwaves.”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 
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Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,88 the Supreme Court reminded that 
“[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the 
broadcasters, which is paramount.”89  According to the Court, 
public interest is superior to private benefit. 
Through regulations the FCC has defined the public interest 
standard of the Communications Act of 1934 as promoting 
competition, diversity, and localism in the radio market.  Courts 
have endorsed this interpretation and recently demanded evidence 
that regulations would advance these principles.  Although the 
standard has remained unchanged, the FCC’s philosophy of the 
most effective means of reaching the public interest goals has 
shifted from regulatory to free market. 
C. Ownership Regulations in the Public Interest 
Soon after the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the 
FCC believed that regulating local and national radio ownership 
was the best method of promoting competition, diversity, and 
localism in the radio market.90  Thus, the FCC began placing limits 
on radio ownership “to encourage diversity of ownership in order 
to foster the expression of varied viewpoints and programming, 
and to safeguard against undue concentration of economic 
power.”91  The concern that unlimited ownership would cause 
harmful concentration of economic power is reflected throughout 
 
364, 377 (1984) (“[T]hose who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a sense as 
fiduciaries for the public.”). 
88 395 U.S. 367. 
89 Id. at 390. 
90 See In re Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regs. Governing Television Broad., 
10 FCC Rcd. 3524, 3527 (1995).  The earliest ownership rules “prohibited the issuance of 
a license to anyone already possessing a license in the same broadcast service unless the 
applicant could demonstrate that the [second] license  would have a pro-competitive 
impact and would not result in the concentration of control . . . inconsistent with the 
public interest.” Id. at 3526–27. 
91 Id. at 563. 
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the early ownership regulations,92 in stark contrast to the FCC’s 
adoption of a free market philosophy during recent deregulation.93 
In 1940, the limit on the national common ownership of FM 
radio stations was six.94  In 1946, the de facto limit on the national 
common ownership of AM radio stations was seven, after the FCC 
denied the application of CBS for an eighth station.95  In its 
decision, the FCC determined that “[it was] against the public 
interest to permit a concentration of control of broadcasting 
facilities in any single person or organization.”96  In 1953, the FCC 
adopted national multiple ownership rules that limited the common 
ownership of radio stations to seven AM and seven FM.97 
On a local level, the FCC regulated duopolies, the common 
ownership of multiple radio stations in the same service (AM or 
FM) in a particular community.98  In 1938, the FCC utilized the 
“diversification of service” rationale when adopting a strong 
presumption against granting licenses that would result in 
duopolies.99  That is, the FCC believed that the greater the number 
of separately owned outlets, the greater the promotion of the public 
interest of diversity.100  Accordingly, the FCC prohibited FM 
duopolies in 1940 and AM duopolies in 1943.101 
The national and local ownership rules remained substantially 
unchanged until the early 1980s, when the FCC began to 
 
92 See, e.g., Sherwood B. Brunton, 11 F.C.C. 407, 413 (1946) (“[I]t’s against the public 
interest to permit a concentration of control of broadcasting facilities in any single person 
or organization.”). 
93 The free market philosophy—marketplace theory—as applied to the radio industry 
suggests that deregulation spurs more competition for listeners, thereby promoting the 
audience interests of diversity and localism. See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23; 
see also infra notes 106–33 and accompanying text. 
94 Rules Governing High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 
(1940). 
95 Brunton, 11 F.C.C. at 413. 
96 Id. 
97 Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 9 Fed. Reg. 1563 (1953). 
98 See In re Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regs. Governing Television Broad., 
10 FCC Rcd. 3524, 3528 (1995). 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
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deregulate.102  Although the FCC still defined the public interest as 
promoting competition, diversity, and local ownership, the FCC no 
longer saw ownership regulations as the best means of achieving 
these goals.103  Instead, the FCC embraced the marketplace theory, 
which suggests that an increase in stations would spur competition 
and encourage the principles of diversity and localism as station 
owners compete for audience.104 Thus far, the peak of radio 
deregulation is the Telecommunications Act of 1996.105 
II. DEREGULATION AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed local radio 
ownership restrictions and eliminated the national ownership 
cap.106  A single entity can now own up to eight radio stations in 
the largest markets.107  Congress intended this amendment to the 
Communications Act of 1934 to spur competition in the radio 
market, which, in turn, would promote service to narrower 
segments of the community and increase diversity and localism.108  
 
102 This was part of a nationwide trend of deregulation—or regulatory reform—begun 
during the Ford administration and continuing through the Reagan era.  “Deregulation . . . 
sought to protect the public interest by commercial competition, rather than by regulatory 
defense of the ‘public interest.’” JEREMY TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: 
THE UNLEASHING OF AMERICA’S COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 3 (1986); see also infra 
notes 109–49 and accompanying text. 
103 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23.  This “represented the policy shift from 
the trusteeship model (where it was difficult for the government to define the public 
interest), to the marketplace model (where the industry would rely on market forces to 
determine the public interest).” Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). 
106 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(a). 
107 Id.  In markets with greater than 45 stations, one entity may own up to 8 stations with 
no more than 5 in one service (AM or FM); in markets with between 30 and 44 stations, 
one entity may own up to 7 stations with no more than 4 in one service; in markets with 
between 1,529 stations, one entity may own up to 6 stations with no more than 4 in one 
service; in markets with up to 14 stations, one entity may own up to 5 stations with no 
more than 3 in one service, as long as the entity does not own more than 50 percent of the 
stations in the market. Id. 
108 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24.  The new ownership rules provide 
“incentives for the development of market power within local radio markets by allowing 
owners to consolidate or cluster groups of stations . . . .” Id. at 25. 
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its massive deregulation 
represent the FCC’s ideological shift from attempting to advance 
the public interest through regulation to pursuing the public 
interest in a deregulated marketplace. 
The shift to deregulation began in the 1980s, when the FCC 
began relaxing radio ownership limits.109  When it raised the 
ownership ceiling to twelve AM and twelve FM stations nationally 
in 1984, “the FCC maintained that diversity was an important 
consideration.”110  By 1992, a single owner could acquire up to 
two AM and two FM stations in markets with at least fifteen 
stations, as long as the combined audience did not exceed twenty-
five percent.111  In markets with less than fifteen stations, a single 
owner could own up to three stations, provided that no more than 
two were in the same service (AM or FM) and that the stations 
represented less than half of the total number of stations in the 
market.112  Nationwide, no more than forty stations could be 
owned by a single entity.113 
By the mid-1990s, many complained that the Communications 
Act of 1934 was outdated and unable to effectively regulate 
communications in a world with new technologies such as cable 
and satellite television, the Internet, and cellular.114  Congress 
 
109 See id. at 23. 
110 See Aguilar, supra note 5 at 1159.  However, “the FCC did not want the objective of 
diversity to work to exclude the benefits of group ownership.” Id. at 1159 n.234. 
111 Richard E. Wiley, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
1996, at 7, 14 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, 
Handbook Series No. 461, 1996) (arguing that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
“address[es] the realities of today’s converging communications marketplace by 
eliminating legal barriers that inhibit or preclude the entry of new competitors”). 
112 Id. at 44. 
113 In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 9 FCC Rcd 7183 (1994).  The FCC 
revised the national limits to increase the cap for minority owners to twenty-five FM 
stations and twenty-five AM stations. Id. 
114 See Ortner, supra note 23, at 146.  President Clinton, when signing the 1996 act into 
law, remarked: “this revolution has been held back by outdated laws designed for a time 
when there was one phone company, three TV networks, no such thing as a personal 
computer.  Today with the stroke of a pen our laws will catch up with our future.” Id. at 
146 n.37 (quoting Federal News Service, Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Vice 
President Al Gore at the Signing of the Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996 (Feb. 9, 
1996)). 
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agreed and passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996.115  
Although much attention went to the restrictions that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 lifted from the common carriers 
and cable companies, the new legislation lifting restrictions on 
radio station ownership received relatively little attention.116 
The FCC, however, determined that the public interest 
principles of competition, diversity, and localism were best served 
through deregulation of ownership restrictions.117  Proponents of 
deregulation agreed with this marketplace theory, advocating that 
fewer restrictions would improve competition, as well as allow 
companies to benefit from the efficiencies found with large-scale 
consolidation.118  Meanwhile, critics of deregulation argued that 
loosening the ownership restrictions would actually stifle 
competition, causing diversity and localism to suffer.119  
 
115 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).  The 
law passed by a vote of 414 to 16 in the House of Representatives, and a vote of 91 to 5 
in the Senate. Wiley, supra note 111, at 16 n.1. 
116 See Ortner, supra note 23, at 146 (opining that the lack of attention mirrored the lack 
of understanding that radio—unlike television and common carriers—still has a ceiling 
on the number of available options). 
117 See In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), stating: 
[P]olicies that may have been necessary in the early days of radio may not be 
necessary in an environment where thousands of licensees offer diverse sorts of 
programming and appeal to all manner of segmented audiences . . . . We 
believe that given conditions in the radio industry, it is time to heed that 
sentiment and to reduce the regulatory role played by Commission policies and 
rules, and to permit the discipline of the marketplace to play a more prominent 
role.  It is our conclusion that the regulations that we are retaining and the 
functioning of the marketplace will result in service in the public interest that is 
more adaptable to changes in consumer preferences and at less financial cost 
and with less regulatory burden. 
118 See, e.g., Robert B. Ekelund et al., Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical 
Analysis of Local and National Concentration, 43 J.L. & ECON. 157, 158 (2000) 
(contending that empirical analysis of increased concentration shows increased 
efficiency); see also infra notes 122–63 and accompanying text. 
119 See, e.g., Jill Howard, Congress Errs in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership Caps: 
More Monopolies, Less Localism, Decreased Diversity and Violations of Equal 
Protection, 5 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 269, 278 (1997) (arguing that deregulation of 
ownership restrictions destroys broadcasting ideals); see also infra notes 134–43 and 
accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, any efficiencies that benefit private interests are 
inferior to the public interest.120 
A. The Marketplace Theory: Serving the Public Interest 
Economics—specifically the marketplace theory—provided the 
foundation for the deregulation movement of the 1970s and 1980s, 
as the government dissolved regulatory bodies that set prices and 
routes for airlines, trucks, and railroads.121  The marketplace 
approach to broadcast regulation proposes that a marketplace 
without ownership restrictions serves the public interest by 
creating a competitive environment.122  Increased competition 
promotes diversity and localism in programming as stations seek 
out specific niche markets to gain the greatest audience share.123  
Thus, the public interest principles of competition, diversity, and 
localism can be achieved through deregulation of ownership 
restrictions.124 
The theory that competition would increase is directly related 
to the expansion of radio from 583 stations in 1934125 to over 
10,000 today.126  The increase in the number of stations, combined 
with the evolution of cable and the Internet, has made the industry 
 
120 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (“It is the right of the viewers 
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”). 
121 ROBERT COOTER, LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (4th ed. 2003).  “Much of the impetus for 
‘deregulation’ has come from the realization that much government activity concerns 
private goods where markets should be lubricated, rather than government intruding 
directly in the process of allocation.” Id. at 109.  One unexpected difficulty was that 
many industry spokespersons initially opposed to regulation found themselves against 
deregulation, as old regulations became “woven securely into the fabric of the 
economy . . . . What first looked like a straightjacket now felt more like an old tweed 
suit.” Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Regulatory Lessons from the Reagan Era: 
Introduction, in REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 3, at 7. (Meiners & Yandle eds., 1989). 
122 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24. 
123 See id. at 24.  “[T]he competition for audience would ensure that audience interests 
were served.” Id. at 23. 
124 See id. at 23 (noting that this position “embodies a shift in the definition of public 
interest from something determined by regulators to something determined by the 
marketplace”). 
125 See In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981). 
126 Williams & Roberts, supra note 12. 
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more competitive.127  Thus, proponents of the marketplace theory 
argue that there is no longer a need for regulations to create 
competition.128  In most markets, there are enough stations and 
competition among them that relaxed ownership restrictions would 
allow market forces to ensure that stations operate in the public 
interest.129  Hence, the FCC argued that the radio marketplace 
would provide a better and more responsive public interest control 
mechanism than governmental regulations designed to monitor 
programming decisions.130 
According to the marketplace theory, a deregulated radio 
marketplace furthers the public interests of diversity and 
localism.131  Diversity is achieved by different profit-minded 
broadcasters competitively seeking out and serving targeted 
audiences.132  As the number of stations increases, there is a 
greater likelihood that minority and niche audiences are served.133  
Likewise, listeners who prefer a station that has local programming 
would create a market for localism. 
The marketplace theory is premised on sufficient 
competition.134  Critics contend that this fundamental assumption 
underlying deregulation is flawed.135  They argue that there may 
not be sufficient competition and, consequently, market forces 
would not compel operation in the public interest.136  The 
assumption that competition would increase through deregulation 
is speculative, and there is little supporting evidence.137  Given the 
lack of evidence, critics point out, deregulation should be pursued 
 
127 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23. 
128 See id. at 20. 
129 See id. 
130 See In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981). 
131 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. at 20. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See Harvey J. Levin, U.S. Broadcast Deregulation: A Case of Dubious Evidence, 36 
J. COMM. 25 (1986). 
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in moderation.138  Abrupt deregulation may result in large-scale 
consolidation and anti-competitive behavior, which would harm 
the public interest.139 
Critics of deregulation also dispute the contention that 
increased competition would promote diversity.140  Even if there is 
sufficient competition, instead of monopolistic behavior, there is 
no evidence that stations would actually provide service to all of 
the niche groups without regulations.141  For example, television’s 
Public Broadcasting Service (“PBS”) has programming that is 
widely recognized to be cultural, informational, and educational, 
but “often has audiences so small as to be nonratable by the 
established ratings services.”142  A station seemingly has no 
monetary incentive to reach out to such a small listener 
audience.143  Furthermore, with relaxed local ownership 
restrictions, it is difficult to explain why a single entity owning 
upwards of eight stations in the largest markets would reach out to 
the smallest groups without the government telling them to do so. 
To the contrary, economist Peter O. Steiner theorized that 
relaxed ownership regulations would result in increased 
programming diversity even in markets where a single entity 
owned multiple stations.144  A single entity owning multiple 
stations in a single market would not want to compete with itself 
for the same group of listeners.145  Thus, the owner would program 
the multiple stations in various ways to appeal to a variety of 
 
138 See Howard, supra note 119, at 278 (stating that “it is a presumptive leap of logic . . . 
to conclude that increased competition warrants complete abandonment of national 
ownership caps which have existed for over half a century”). 
139 See id. 
140 See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 5, at 1164 (arguing that the Telecommunications Act 
has caused the broadcast industry to stray from the goals of localism, diversity, and 
competitiveness). 
141 See Levin, supra note 137, at 29. 
142 Id. 
143 See id. 
144 Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of 
Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. ECON. 194 (1952) (theorizing that increased 
ownership concentration on the local level would lead to a subsequent increase in formats 
in order to reach more listeners). 
145 Id. at 212. 
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listeners.146  In contrast, multiple owners of single stations in the 
same market may all compete against each other within the same 
format, targeting the same group of listeners.147 
Steiner, however, concluded that, although competition 
generally leads to greater diversity, markets with limited numbers 
of stations and barriers to entry would lead to program duplication 
which would not serve the public interest of diverse 
programming.148  Thus, consolidation could be harmful to smaller 
markets and markets with existing anti-competitive behavior.149  
Once again, sufficient competition within a marketplace proves to 
be the foundation necessary to ensure diverse programming. 
The marketplace theory and corresponding deregulation of 
ownership restrictions look to the market to promote the public 
interest.  The theory only works, however, within a genuine 
competitive marketplace.  Without competition, there is minimal 
incentive to act in the public interest. 
B. Economies of Scale and Scope: Serving the Private Interest 
Deregulation of ownership restrictions should serve the public 
interest, according to marketplace theory proponents.150  Likewise, 
deregulation could also serve the private interests of 
 
146 Id.  If there is a monopoly, where the only two stations in a market are owned by the 
same entity, and eighty percent of the audience wants to listen to a country music format 
and twenty percent wants to listen to a classical music format, the entity would not want 
to compete against itself.  Thus, one station would have a country music format and the 
other station would have a classical music format in order to reach the most possible 
listeners. 
147 Id. at 211.  If there are only two separately owned stations in a market where eighty 
percent of the audience wants to listen to a country music format and twenty percent 
wants to listen to a classical music format, the two stations would have no motivation to 
have a classical music format.  Sharing the country music format could give each station 
forty percent of the listeners in the market, compared to a maximum of twenty percent of 
the listeners with a classical music format. 
148 Id. at 215 (“The conclusion here is that even given perfect shiftability (the situation 
that makes diversity most likely to appeal to stations) there is likely to be substantial 
duplication and repetition; the number of stations required to achieve production of 
relatively less popular program types is quite large.”). 
149 See id. (concluding that “the great duplication of repetition of programs . . . serves 
not at all to increase satisfaction”). 
150 See supra notes 122–33 and accompanying text. 
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broadcasters.151  Without ownership restrictions, conglomerates 
can consolidate radio ownership and profit from resulting benefits 
of economies of scale and scope.152 
The efficiency theory proposes that larger entities “achieve 
greater product efficiency through economies of scale.”153  That is, 
as a company grows larger, it can consolidate its resources to 
operate more efficiently than a smaller firm.154  For example, an 
owner of five radio stations can consolidate its news department so 
that each station only bears one-fifth of the cost.  Conversely, an 
entity that owns one station must bear the entire cost of its news 
department or choose to eliminate it. 
Deregulation of ownership restrictions and the resulting 
consolidation of the radio industry would create new operational 
efficiencies, including the sharing of management and production 
and programming personnel, as well as clerical staff.155  
Additionally, bulk discounts on services and supplies as well as 
shared advertising, promotions, and technical facilities decrease 
the costs of doing business.156  Proponents of deregulation argue 
that these efficiencies resulting from consolidation do not solely 
benefit the broadcasters.157  The profits can be passed on to the 
 
151 For example, using one news department to bring the news to multiple stations saves 
money for the owner.  See also infra notes 152–63 and accompanying text. 
152 An economy of scale occurs when there is “a reduction in long-run average cost as a 
result of an expansion in output which leads to increasing returns to scale.” DONALD 
RUTHERFORD, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 141 (Routledge 1992).  An economy of scope 
occurs when there is “a reduction in average cost brought about by the joint production of 
two or more goods (or services) by a single firm, rather than by several firms.  The 
similarities of the products permit the use of the same factor inputs for the different 
products.” Id.; see also infra notes 153–63 and accompanying text. 
153 Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust Perspective of 
Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 490 (2000) (arguing that 
broadcast ownership regulations increase the costs of doing business at a time when cost-
saving efficiencies may be critical to a station’s survival). 
154 See id. 
155 See Ekelund, supra note 118, at 158 (arguing that concentration, collusion, and 
profits will rise if concentration results in long-run cost savings). 
156 Id. 
157 See Media Ownership: Radio Industry Before the House Comm. on Commerce, Sci. 
& Transport., 108th Cong. (Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Lowry 
Mays).  Mays is chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Clear Channel 
Worldwide.  Lowry, a former investment banker, began Clear Channel Communications 
with the purchase of a single station in San Antonio, Texas in 1972. ClearChannel, Lowry 
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consumer through improved facilities, stronger signals, and more 
expensive talent.158 
Radio station owners also benefit from economies of scope.159  
“Economies of scope are created when a [company] is able to 
create new and innovative products due to efficiencies produced by 
its expanded production.”160  For example, an owner of multiple 
stations has the resources to form a “creative services team” to 
share ideas and improve creative efforts, in contrast to a single 
station owner who may only be able to afford one creative writer 
who would not be as consistent.161 
Furthermore, large radio conglomerates have more financial 
capital to reinvest in local radio stations and markets than smaller 
owners.162  Thus, advances in radio such as voice-tracking and new 
formats arise from the consolidation of resources and can bring the 
audience a better product.163  Also, larger companies are better 
equipped to maintain costs of growing news departments than 
smaller owners.164 
III. CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
With the marketplace theory and the benefits of economies of 
scale and scope in mind, Congress passed the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.165  No longer merely speculation, the marketplace 
theory was being put to the test in the radio market.  Since then, the 
debate over radio ownership regulations has centered upon the 
validity of the marketplace theory; that is, whether deregulated 
 
Mays Biography, at http://www.clearchannel.com/company_execbio_lowry.php (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
158 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays). 
159 See Leeper, supra note 153, at 492. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays). 
163 Another potential benefit is syndication. See infra notes 282–90 and accompanying 
text. 
164 Steve Knoll, Radio Station Consolidation: Good News for Owners, But What About 
Listeners?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at D5. 
165 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). 
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ownership restrictions have resulted in a competitive market that 
promotes diversity and localism. 
U.S. Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) views the deregulated 
ownership restrictions as spurring harmful consolidation and anti-
competitive practices by companies that control large portions of 
the radio and concert industries.166  Consequently, he introduced a 
bill to curb any further deregulation.167  The Competition in Radio 
and Concert Industries Act of 2003 calls for, among other things, 
enhanced scrutiny of further consolidation in radio.168  
Furthermore, Congress continues to evaluate deregulation, as the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held 
media consolidation hearings chaired by U.S. Senator John 
McCain (R-Ariz.) throughout 2003.169 
Meanwhile, the Telecommunications Act requires the FCC to 
review its media ownership rules biennially to determine “whether 
any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as a result of 
competition.”170  The FCC initiated its third biennial review of its 
media ownership rules in September 2002.171  On June 2, 2003, the 
FCC voted to enact new rules further relaxing media ownership 
restrictions: allowing television networks to acquire enough 
stations to reach forty-five percent of the nation’s viewers instead 
of thirty-five percent, permitting the same company to own 
newspapers and broadcast stations in the same city and to own as 
many as three television stations and eight radio stations in the 
 
166 Craig Gilbert, Music Industry Consolidation Has Feingold Singing the Blues, JS 
ONLINE: MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Jan. 8, 2003), at 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/nat/jan03/108839.asp (Feingold said, “We must speak out 
to give our airwaves back to the public.”). 
167 Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act, S. 221, 108th Cong. (2003). 
168 Id. § 4. 
169 See Media Ownership (Radio Consolidation) Before the House Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci. & Transport., 108th Cong. (July 8, 2003); Media Ownership Before the 
House Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transport., 108th Cong. (May 22, 2003); Media 
Ownership (Broadcast Television) Before the House Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & 
Transport., 108th Cong. (May 13, 2003); Media Ownership (Video Markets) Before the 
House Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transport., 108th Cong. (May 6, 2003); Hearings, 
supra note 157. 
170 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111–
12 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). 
171 See FCC Press Release, supra note 18. 
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same market.172  Reflecting Senator Feingold’s concerns about the 
dangers of excessive deregulation, however, Congress rallied 
against the FCC.173  In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit issued an order staying the enactment of the proposed 
rules only one day before the rules were scheduled to take effect.174  
Amidst the drama surrounding the FCC’s “aggressive agenda of 
deregulation,”175 radio ownership rules were left virtually 
unchanged.176 
As part of the review process, the FCC adopted a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on September 12, 2002.177  In it, the FCC 
affirmed its traditional goals of promoting the three principles of 
“public interest”: competition, diversity, and localism in the local 
 
172 Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Statutes of 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. pt. 73) (“The Commission believes these actions are necessary . . . to protect the 
Commission’s chief goals in effectively regulating broadcasting, to promote diversity, 
localism, and competition.”). 
173 Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.) said the FCC’s decision “betrayed the public trust.” 
Eric Boehlert, Congress to Big Media: Not So Fast, Salon, at 
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/07/23/fcc/print.html (July 23, 2003).  On 
June 19, 2003, the Commerce Committee passed legislation that would undo the FCC 
vote, and the House Appropriations Committee voted to attach a rider to an 
appropriations bill that would prohibit the FCC from implementing its ownership rules at 
the cost of forfeiting its annual budget from Congress. Stephen Labaton, U.S. Court 
Blocks Plan to Ease Rule on Media Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at A1.  William 
Safire wrote: 
Here is what made this happen.  Take the force of right-wingers upholding 
community standards who are determined to defend local control of the public 
airwaves; combine that with the force of lefties eager to maintain diversity of 
opinion in local media; add in the independent voters’ mistrust of media 
manipulation; then let all these people have access to their representatives by e-
mail and fax, and voila!  Congress awakens to slap down the power grab. 
Localism’s Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at A27. 
174 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) 
(“Given the magnitude of this matter and the public’s interest in reaching the proper 
resolution, a stay is warranted pending thorough and efficient judicial review.”). 
175 Boehlert, supra note 173. 
176 See Jennifer Lee, Left Out of the FCC Feast: Rules Are Eased for All Media Except 
Radio, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at Finance 12.  Perhaps Clear Channel Corporation is 
to blame.  The company’s rapid growth in radio and other industries “has drawn the 
wrath of musicians, who accuse it of using its concert division to strong-arm musicians, 
and the scrutiny of Congress, where many members contend that the company has 
engaged in anti-competitive practices.” Id. 
177 FCC Press Release, supra note 18. 
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media market.178  The FCC investigated whether: (1) the 
marketplace provides a sufficient level of competition to protect 
and advance the above policy goals; (2) current ownership rules 
achieve these goals; and (3) revisions to the rules are required to 
protect and advance competition, diversity, and localism in the 
media market.179 
A. How Consolidation Stifles Competition 
Because the marketplace theory is a basis for the trend toward 
deregulation, sufficient competition is an integral foundation.180  
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 intended to open 
up competition, the deregulation of ownership limits has led to an 
increased concentration of ownership.181  This increased 
concentration resulted in anti-competitive behavior, undermining 
Congress’ intent for a competitive marketplace. 
The massive consolidation of the radio industry began 
immediately after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.182  In the subsequent two years, about 4,000 of the nation’s 
11,000 radio stations changed hands.183  In 1998, Clear Channel 
Communications (“Clear Channel”) merged with Jacor 
Communications for $4.4 billion in the biggest media transaction 
of the year.184 
 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 See supra notes 121–49 and accompanying text. 
181 Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence 
from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1009, 1010 (2001) (noting that the increase in 
concentration of ownership in the radio market was substantial and largely driven by 
deregulation). 
182 See infra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
183 Christopher Parkes, Change of Tack Takes Radio into the US Media Mainstream: 
Chancellor’s $1.5bn Lin Buy Highlights Operator’s Strategy, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(London), July 10, 1998, at 24.  As of March 2002, fifty entities owned twenty or more 
stations, compared to twenty-five in March 1996. Williams & Roberts, supra note 12. 
184 Elizabeth A. Rathbun, Going, Going, Gone . . . Slowdown in Radio Consolidation 
Offset by Broadcasting Megadeals, BRDCST. & CABLE, Feb. 15, 1999, at 33 (adding that 
the second-largest deal of the year occurred when Chancellor Media Corporation bought 
out Capstar Broadcasting Partners, Inc.—a radio company—for $3.9 billion). 
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From March 1996 to March 2002, the number of radio stations 
in the nation increased 5.4 percent from 10,257 to 10,807.185  
During the same period, however, the number of owners decreased 
33.6 percent, from 5,133 to 3,408.186  In that time, the two largest 
radio chains grew from fewer than 65 stations187 to over 1,400.188  
Clear Channel currently operates approximately 1,225 stations,189 
up from just 36 prior to the passage of the Telecommunications 
Act.190  That is an ownership increase of 3,288 percent in seven 
years. 
With the remarkable expansion of radio station ownership 
comes a dramatic increase of listeners falling within the influence 
of a limited number of entities.  Four radio groups—Chancellor 
Media Corporation, Clear Channel, Infinity Broadcasting Corp. 
(owned by Viacom) and Capstar—control access to 63 percent of 
contemporary hit radio/top 40 formats and their 41 million 
listeners, as well as 56 percent of the country format and their 28 
million listeners.191  In total, Clear Channel has 103.4 million 
listeners, or a 27 percent nationwide listener share.192  Viacom has 
 
185 Williams & Roberts, supra note 12, at 3. 
186 Id.  There was a cumulative decline of the average number of owners per market, 
from 13.5 to 9.9. Id. at 6. 
187 William Glanz, Radio-Market Consolidation Hits Sour Note, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2003, at C8 (chronicling Senator Russell D. Feingold’s efforts to secure tighter 
restrictions on radio ownership). 
188 Safire, supra note 1. 
189 Clear Channel, Company Information, at http://www.clearchannel.com/company.php 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
190 Leeds, supra note 15. 
191 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT 
ON CURRENT ISSUES IN RADIO 3 (May 24, 2002) [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT], available 
at http://www.aftra.org/resources/pr/0502/stmt524.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).  The 
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (“AFTRA”), the American 
Federation of Musicians (“AFM”), and eight other groups delivered this statement to the 
FCC and Congress. Press Release, AFTRA, Artists Group Delivers “Joint Statement on 
Current Issues on Radio” to FCC and Congress (May 24, 2002), available at 
http://www.aftra.org/resources/pr/0502/pr0524.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
192 FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 14, at 24.  The Future of Music Coalition is 
a not-for-profit organization which “seeks to educate the media, policymakers, and the 
public about music/technology issues, while also bringing together diverse voices in an 
effort to come up with creative solutions” to current issues. Future of Music Coalition, at 
http://www.futureofmusic.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
PRINDLE FORMAT 12/9/2003  2:34 PM 
2003] RADIO CONSOLIDATION AND DIMINISHED DIVERSITY 307 
59.1 million listeners, giving them a 15.4 percent share.193  Clear 
Channel had $3.25 billion in revenue in 2001, which accounted for 
27.5 percent of the nationwide revenue share.194  Likewise, 
Viacom had $2.081 billion of revenue for 17.6 percent of the 
nationwide revenue share.195  The largest firm in each market 
averages 47 percent of the market’s total radio advertising revenue, 
while the two largest firms in each radio market average 74 percent 
of the market’s advertising revenue.196  It pays to consolidate. 
There is no doubt that the radio market has seen large-scale 
concentration of ownership in a short period.197  Because 
consolidation facilitates anti-competitive behavior, diversity and 
localism suffer, as there are no outside forces—neither 
marketplace competition nor regulation—forcing corporations to 
seek out and serve the smaller audiences.  A glaring example of 
anti-competitive behavior enhanced by consolidation is the 
continuing practice of payola, effectively shutting out small labels 
and new and independent artists.198 
 
193 FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 14, at 24. 
194 Id. at 25. 
195 Id. 
196 Williams & Roberts, supra note 12, at 3.  In 180 of the 285 Arbitron radio markets, 
one entity controls more than forty percent of the market’s total radio advertising 
revenue.  In 93 of the 285 Arbitron radio markets, the top two entites control more than 
eighty percent of the market’s total radio advertising revenue. Id. at 5. 
197 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) and the four-firm concentration ratio are 
commonly accepted measures of market concentration which both show heavy 
concentration in the radio market.  The HHI is “calculated by squaring the market share 
of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers . . . 
[taking] into account the relative size and distribution of the firms in a market . . . . 
[Markets] in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be 
concentrated.” Department of Justice, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).  Between 
1993 and 1997 the average HHI across 243 major media markets increased 64.7 percent 
from 1,272 to 2,096. Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 181.  The four-firm concentration 
ratio is calculated by combining the percentage of market revenue held by the four firms 
in each market with the largest revenue.  For the period March 2001 to March 2002, the 
top 4 firms held 86 percent of the market revenue in the 50 largest markets, and 96 
percent of the market revenue in the 100 smallest markets. Williams & Roberts, supra 
note 12. 
198 Payola—also called “pay for play”—refers to the practice of record labels paying 
radio stations for increased exposure or promotion of a particular song or artist. See Eric 
Boehlert, Pay for Play, Salon, at http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/03/14/payola 
(Mar. 14, 2001).  Since payola is illegal, independent record promoters have become the 
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For a recording artist, getting commercial airplay is the “holy 
grail” of the recording industry.199  Without airplay, it is virtually 
impossible to sustain a career.200  Radio consolidation has made it 
more difficult—and more expensive—for an artist to get radio 
airplay.201  Payola is the long-time practice of exchanging money 
for increased exposure or promotion of a particular song or 
artist.202  Despite laws prohibiting undisclosed payments for 
broadcast, legal loopholes allow payola to continue.203  
Independent record promoters—called “indies”—act as “high-
priced toll collector[s]” and lobbyists between record labels and 
radio stations, allowing stations to be one-step removed from label 
money and, thus, payment no longer falls within the technical 
definition of payola.204  In return for airplay, promoters often give 
the radio stations money in the form of “promotional support.”205 
Since there are more songs produced than can be heard by the 
listening public, record companies feel pressured to practice payola 
 
middlemen between the labels and stations. See id.  The record labels hire independent 
labels, or “indies,” to promote an artist, and the indies promise stations promotional 
payments. See id.  Deregulation and subsequent consolidation has resulted in more 
powerful independent record promoters, higher costs to record labels and artists, and the 
shutting out of smaller artists and labels. See id. 
199 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Don Henley on behalf of the Recording 
Artists Coalition).  Henley has won six Grammy Awards and sold over 100 million 
albums worldwide as a singer and songwriter, first as a member of the Eagles, and then as 
a solo artist. Don Henley Biography, at http://www.wbr.com/donhenley/bioreal.html (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
200 See Eric Boehlert, Record Companies: Save Us From Ourselves!, Salon, at 
http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/03/13/indie_promotion/index.html (Mar. 13, 
2002) (fearing that musicians who complain about independent promoters will be kept off 
radio). 
201 See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley) (arguing that stations are able to 
charge more money to record labels and artists, since consolidation has limited their 
options). 
202 Lauren J. Katunich, Comment, Time to Quit Paying the Payola Piper: Why Music 
Industry Abuse Demands a Complete System Overhaul, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 643, 
644 (2002) (concluding that payola laws must be updated to better reflect the economic 
realities of the music industry). 
203 Id. at 655–56. 
204 Id. at 656.  In other words, radio stations and record labels are subverting the law 
simply by using middle men. 
205 Id. at 658 (“The promotional budget supplied by the indie, supposedly used by the 
radio station to buy T-shirts, billboard ads, and station vans, is in reality spent by the 
station in any manner that it sees fit.”). 
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to secure airtime.206  Although the Internet, touring, and other 
alternative marketing techniques help generate sales, “mainstream 
radio play is still the engine that drives the media business.”207  
Radio airplay creates exposure and should help the artist, not 
provide excessive benefits to the corporation.  When independent 
labels forgo seeking expensive radio airplay, they guarantee lower 
sales and limit the ability of small labels to expand.208 
The pressure on record companies increased with the loosening 
of ownership restrictions by the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.209  With multiple stations in multiple markets controlled by 
the same company, the number of station outlets to turn to for 
airplay is drastically reduced, especially if one entity were to reject 
a particular artist or song.210  Consolidated radio stations have 
gained leverage in negotiating programming and advertising 
contracts, because they control a larger audience.211  Therefore, the 
consideration sought for radio airplay has increased due to less 
competition among radio stations.212  Promoters charge record 
companies as much as $4,000 per song to obtain airplay for new 
releases.213  Major record conglomerates put up an estimated $100 
million a year, which small labels simply cannot match.214 
Clear Channel, the nation’s largest radio conglomerate, holds a 
27 percent nationwide listener share of 103.4 million listeners.215  
They suggest that record companies that are dissatisfied with the 
system discontinue the practice of making payments to 
 
206 See id. at 645.  “[R]ecord companies rely on approximately 1,000 of the largest 
[commercial radio stations] to create hits and sell records.  Each of these 1,000 stations 
adds roughly three new songs to its playlist each week.”  Boehlert, supra note 198. 
207 Boehlert, supra note 198. 
208 Jeff Leeds, Small Record Labels Say Radio Tunes Them Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2001, at Business 1 (finding that consolidation puts fewer programmers in control of 
playlists, which creates fear among independent labels that prices may continue to rise). 
209 See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley) (stating “the more powerful the 
radio network, the greater the pressure on artists and labels to spend promotion money”). 
210 Katunich, supra note 202, at 654. 
211 Id. at 653–54. 
212 See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley). 
213 Leeds, supra note 208. 
214 Id. 
215 FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 192, at 24. 
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independent promoters in the pursuit of airplay.216  That may not 
be possible, however, if conglomerates like Clear Channel take 
advantage of their size.  For instance, Clear Channel has suggested 
a policy of selling song identification as a form of advertising, by 
making record labels pay for the identification of the song title and 
artist name.217  Additionally, the company has discussed charging 
record labels for airplay statistics.218 
Another potential abuse of consolidation may be in the form of 
an alliance between a radio conglomerate and a large independent 
promotion firm.219  The resulting clout could allow the radio owner 
to institute national buys for new singles at excessive prices.220  
Any label or artist that does not pay could find its song out of the 
rotations of some of the largest radio stations in every market.221 
In its Joint Statement on Current Issues in Radio, issued May 
2002, a coalition of performing artists, record labels, songwriters, 
community broadcasters, and others condemned the anti-
competitive practices of radio conglomerates, noting that “[d]ue to 
 
216 See Gilbert, supra note 166 (noting that Clear Channel spokesperson Andy Levin 
said any perceived homogenization on the radio has more to do with record labels 
choosing which artists to promote rather than radio station programming). 
217 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 191, at 3. 
218 Chuck Philips, Company Town: Clear Channel Fined Just $8,000 by FCC for 
Payola Violation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at C1 (stating that “[m]eanwhile, artist 
managers continue to privately complain that numerous pop acts are being pressured by 
Clear Channel and other radio giants to perform without pay at radio station benefit 
shows, which though providing income for local charities, also bolster ratings and 
advertising revenue for broadcasters”). 
219 In 2001, there were rampant rumors that Clear Channel would create a strategic 
alliance with Tri State Promotions & Marketing, one of the largest independent 
promotion firms in the nation. Boehlert, supra note 198  The firm has been closely 
aligned with Clear Channel for years, but such an agreement would make Tri State the 
exclusive promoter working with Clear Channel. Id.  In April 2003, Clear Channel 
announced that it will sever ties with independent promotion firms in order to distance 
itself from the payola stigma. Adrian McCoy, Pay-for-Play Static Cuts Clear Channel 
Indie Ties, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 26, 2003, at C6 (“In the end, the shift away 
from independent promoters may be imperceptible to radio listeners.”). 
220 One radio insider opined, “Labels would pay $100,000 or $200,000 to get a single 
added to all the Clear Channel format stations one week. . . . And if they don’t pay, there 
is no chance . . . they’re getting that song on the radio without Tri State.  If it’s not on the 
list, it’s not on the stations.” Id. 
221 Id. (noting that if a song is not played on the radio, it will not make the record 
company any money). 
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sheer market power, radio station groups now have the ability to 
make or break a hit song.”222  Dave Lebental, the president of 
small rock label Pinch Hit Records, reflects the concerns of small 
record labels as consolidation drives up promoters’ prices, 
commenting, “It’s not set up for outsiders to come in.  It’s not a 
wide-open marketplace.”223 
Radio ownership consolidation can lead to anti-competitive 
behavior that reaches beyond the broadcast radio market as an 
entity expands into other industries and has incentives to behave 
monopolistically.224  Along with owning more radio stations than 
any other company, Clear Channel is the nation’s largest live 
entertainment company—after a $4.4 billion merger with SFX 
Entertainment, Inc. in 2000225—with 135 American venues and a 
concert-booking arm that purchases entire tours.226  The company 
promotes or produces 26,000 events annually, with attendance 
reaching 62 million.227  The conglomerate is also the nation’s 
largest outdoor advertising company, with 776,000 billboards, 
airport signs, and public transportation signs around the world.228  
Thus, Clear Channel controls the talent, distribution, booking, 
venues, and advertising of an entire industry.229 
 
222 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 191, at 3. 
223 Leeds, supra note 208. 
224 In order for an owner of concert venues and radio stations to ensure sell-outs at the 
venues, the entity may threaten limited airplay for artists unless they play when and 
where the entity so desires. 
225 See Keri Mattox, SFX Entertainment Agrees to $4.4 Billion Merger, TIMES UNION 
(Albany, N.Y.), July 28, 2000, at E1. 
226 Rob Hotakainen & Jon Bream, Wrestling with Rock, Radio, and Revenue: The Rise—
and Some Say Dominance—of Clear Channel Has Led to Calls for Change, STAR 
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), June 30, 2002, at 1A (noting that the 135 venues account for 
seventy percent of major concert ticket sales). 
227 Maureen Dezell, Is Bigger Better?  In the Entertainment Business Clear Channel Is 
Everywhere, and Critics Say That Is the Problem, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2002, at L1 
(noting that “[s]ize matters in the entertainment industry, and by this standard alone, 
Clear Channel is unparalleled”). 
228 See Roy Bragg, Concert Behemoth Clear Channel Accused of Not Playing Fair, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 3, 2003, at 1A (stating that “[a] global leader in outdoor 
advertising, its. . .holdings worldwide range from taxi tops in Boston, to bus stop displays 
in China, to the brightest, most technically enhanced billboards in Times Square”); 
Dezell, supra note 227. 
229 Dezell, supra note 227. 
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Critics worry that the company misuses its power over the 
radio and music industries.230  They believe Clear Channel 
“overpays for bands and buys up entire tours,” driving smaller 
competitors out of business because they cannot afford to 
compete.231  The public bears the cost, as concert-goers saw ticket 
prices for the top 100 touring acts rise 70 percent from 1996 to 
2001.232  Furthermore, industry insiders tell of advertising pricing 
policies that undermine competing stations, payment deals that 
skirt anti-payola laws, purchases of stations across the Mexican 
border to bypass limits on domestic ownership, and strong-arming 
artists to perform with Clear Channel’s concert production 
division.233 
Clear Channel took on tremendous debt in order to grow into a 
powerful entity and is a publicly owned corporation that must 
fulfill its duties to its shareholders.234  Thus, the company is 
motivated to make artists tour as much as possible and fill as many 
venues as possible.235  Clear Channel’s ownership consolidation 
allows the company to take advantage of artists, who need radio 
airplay to gain new fans and maintain old ones.236  Artists fear that 
they may not get their songs played on Clear Channel radio 
stations if they decide not to “play ball” with Clear Channel the 
concert promoter.237  Meanwhile, fledgling and second-tier talents 
suffer from lack of exposure in terms of venue and airplay.238 
 
230 See Bragg, supra note 228. 
231 Id. 
232 See Hotakainen & Bream, supra note 226 (pointing out that ticket prices have gone 
from $25.61 to $43.86). 
233 Jennifer Lee, U.S. Radio Giant Faces Competition Inquiry, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 
1, 2003, at Finance 11 (citing Congressional testimony). 
234 See Dezell, supra note 227. 
235 Id. (noting that “[i]t competes ruthlessly to do that”). 
236 See Tim Feran, Fear of Clear: Competitors Worry Radio Industry Giant’s New Clout 
Will Leave Them Out, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Dec. 16, 2001, at 1E (comparing 
competitors and Clear Channel to David and Goliath). 
237 Hotakainen & Brown, supra note 226. 
238 Dezell, supra note 227. 
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B. Diminishing Diversity: The Homogenization of Radio 
Far from regulating ownership in the name of diversity,239 the 
deregulation of ownership standards is intended to promote 
programming diversity as competitive stations seek out specific 
niche markets to gain the greatest audience share.240  Proponents of 
deregulation contend that consolidation has resulted in more 
diversity and newer formats.241  Critics charge that consolidation 
has led to a homogenization in the music played on the radio.242  
There are more formats, but the significance of formats as a 
measure of diversity is uncertain.243 
Deregulation advocates point to radio consolidation and the 
corresponding increase in number of formats as proof that relaxed 
ownership restrictions result in increased programming 
diversity.244  According to research conducted by Bear, Stearns & 
Co., the number of core formats has risen seven percent since 
1996.245  Additionally, Spanish language formats have increased 
by over eighty percent in the last decade.246 
 
239 See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (upholding 
regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or television 
broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community based on the 
FCC’s policy of promoting diversification of mass media). 
240 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24. 
241 See Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 181, at 1018 (noting that “increases in 
concentration appear to reduce the incentive to add stations and to increase variety, both 
absolutely and conditional on the number of stations”). 
242 See Ortner, supra note 23, at 172 (arguing that consolidation has “effectively 
homogenized the programming heard across the country and stifled the diversity of 
voices emanating from the airwaves”). 
243 Due to significant overlapping of songs, more formats may not necessarily mean 
more diversity. See infra notes 247–64 and accompanying text. 
244 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays). 
245 Bear, Stearns & Co., Format Diversity: More from Less? 2 (Nov. 4, 2002) 
(maintaining that the rapid consolidation of radio following the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 has created more diversity in programming), available at 
http://www.nab.org/FormatDiversity (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
246 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Edward Fritts).  Fritts is the president and 
chief executive officer of the National Association of Broadcasters. Id. 
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Many argue, however, that formats are a poor measure of 
diversity.247  Sub-classifications are misleading, considering that a 
number of different classifications can mean virtually the same 
thing.248  In addition to the adult contemporary format, for 
example, there are hot adult contemporary, rock adult 
contemporary, urban adult contemporary, mix adult contemporary, 
soft adult contemporary, light adult contemporary, and others.249  
Playlists, rather than formats, are more accurate evaluators of 
programming diversity.250 
The Future of Music Coalition report of November 18, 2002 
analyzed playlists and found substantial overlap between 
formats.251  In the most extreme case, there was a seventy-six 
percent overlap as thirty-eight of the top fifty songs on two charts 
were identical.252  This trend reveals a homogenization in the 
music played on the radio.253  As conglomerates purchase more 
local and independent radio stations, playlists contract and become 
uniform.254 
Large owners blame perceived homogenization on the record 
labels’ practice of promoting a small amount of new artists each 
year.255  What the public hears is often what the record industry 
promotes the most.256  Furthermore, record companies fail to take 
the risks necessary to sign, produce, and promote new artists.257 
Record companies respond that they would be willing to 
promote more artists if not deterred by the high costs of payola.258  
The practice of pay for play not only pushes out smaller labels and 
 
247 See FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 192, at 41 (charging that some stations 
change the name of their format for marketing purposes, while leaving the playlist 
unchanged). 
248 See id. at 44. 
249 Id. at 49. 
250 See id. at 44. 
251 Id. at 44–48. 
252 Id. at 49.  For the week ending August 2, 2002, the CHR/Rhythmic and Urban 
formats shared thirty-eight songs out of top fifty most played. Id. 
253 See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley). 
254 See id. 
255 Gilbert, supra note 166. 
256 Id. 
257 See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays). 
258 See Leeds, supra note 213. 
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independent artists,259 but also restricts the amount of new artists 
on which large record companies take a chance.260  As a result, 
there exists a homogenization of music on the airwaves.261 
Despite Steiner’s theory that increased ownership 
concentration on the local level would lead to a subsequent 
increase in formats in order to reach more listeners, there is little 
evidence that deregulation has led companies to seek out specific 
niche markets.262  Detractors complain of a reduction of classical 
and jazz formats from the airwaves.263  Those listeners, apparently 
not sufficiently served by radio, have turned to the Internet, as 
three of the eleven most-visited commercial music Web sites 
consist of classical or jazz formats.264 
Although a firm owning multiple stations seems to have an 
incentive not to allow the individual stations to compete with each 
other, this does not necessarily result in more diverse formats in an 
effort to reach more listeners.265  A firm owning multiple stations 
can prevent excessive intra-firm competition simply by closing 
some stations.266  Furthermore, a firm interested in reaching more 
listeners than any other station in the market does not have to 
program formats that appeal to each group.267  Instead, the firm 
 
259 See id. 
260 See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley). 
261 See id. 
262 Steiner, supra note 144, at 210. 
263 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 191, at 4 (calling for the FCC to investigate the 
consolidation of radio ownership and the reduction of classical, jazz, bluegrass, and other 
formats from the airwaves). 
264 See Press Release, Arbitron, MUSICMATCH Is Top Non-Commercial Internet 
Broadcast Network in July According to Arbitron Internet Broadcast Ratings (Aug. 19, 
2003), available at http://www.arbitron.com/home/content.stm (last visited Nov. 21, 
2003).  In January 2003, five of the top ten were classical or jazz. Press Release, 
Arbitron, Three Classical Stations Rank Within the Top Ten Channels According to 
Arbitron’s Measure Cast Ratings (Jan. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.arbitron.com/newsroom/archive/WCR01_23_03.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 
2003). 
265 Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 181, at 1022 (arguing that monopolistic firms act to 
pre-empt entry of new firms into the marketplace by crowding a particular format with 
only mildly diverse programming). 
266 Id. at 1011 (“If this can be done in a way that does not attract entry, then variety is 
reduced.”). 
267 Id. at 1012. 
PRINDLE FORMAT 12/9/2003  2:34 PM 
316 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:279 
could program formats in ways that crowd the most popular 
format, in order to deter new stations from entering the market.268  
Thus, the incentive to control the entire market coupled with the 
incentive to keep competitors out of the market results in formats 
that are “differentiated, but not by too much.”269  A market where 
monopolistic firms program in order to deter new competitors and 
control the entire market illustrates a market that is non-
competitive and not sufficiently diverse to reach the niche 
listeners. 
C. Localism Sacrificed for Efficiency 
In a Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings 
adopted in 1965, the FCC said, “local residence complements the 
statutory scheme and [FCC] allocation policy of licensing a large 
number of stations throughout the country, in order to provide for 
attention to local interests, and local ownership also generally 
accords with the goal of diversifying control of broadcast 
stations.”270  As deregulation of radio has turned into consolidation 
of radio, however, many local stations are far away from their 
parent company management.271  A station’s news and public 
service programming reflects the character of the local 
communities,272 and radio consolidation has sacrificed that 
character in many communities. 
 
268 Id.  Recalling the examples, supra notes 146–47, if there is a monopoly, where the 
only two stations in a market are owned by the same entity, and eighty percent of the 
audience wants to listen to a country music format and twenty percent wants to listen to a 
classical music format, the entity could crowd the country music format in order to deter 
new stations from entering the market by closing any holes in the format space.  Thus, 
one station would have a country music format appealing to fans of Garth Brooks and 
Tim McGraw and the other station would have a country music format appealing to fans 
of Hank Williams and Johnny Cash, in order to reach and retain the most possible 
listeners of the largest format in the market.  As a result, no station would reach the niche 
market of classical music listeners, and the two remaining formats would consist of 
extreme overlap and little diversity. 
269 Id. 
270 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). 
271 Clear Channel is headquartered in San Antonio, Texas and owns approximately 
1,225 stations nationwide.  ClearChannel, Company Profile, at 
http://www.clearchannel.com/company.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
272 Knoll, supra note 164 (reporting that many radio listeners are finding themselves 
with fewer sources of local news as news staffs are consolidated). 
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Successful localism demands comprehensive newscasts and 
plentiful public affairs programming.273  The FCC has noted that it 
is important “in a free society to prevent a concentration of control 
of the sources of news and opinion.”274  But as radio station 
ownership consolidates so that a single owner may control up to 
eight stations in the largest markets, news staffs are being 
combined.275  As a result, many listeners find themselves with 
fewer sources of local news.276  In many communities, the local 
radio newscast has been abandoned in favor of someone reading 
news and weather from the nationwide Associated Press.277  As 
one commentator put it, “There is hardly anything more juxtaposed 
to localism than mass produced news.”278 
Conversely, large conglomerates have the resources to support 
growing news departments.279  Many smaller radio stations are 
unable to maintain the costs of news departments.280  Stations that 
are not taking advantage of the efficiencies of economy of scale 
may end up off the air, altogether depriving communities of the 
local service.281 
Large conglomerates, which have more capital to reinvest in 
local radio stations and markets than smaller owners, take 
advantage of economies of scope to create new and innovative 
products for radio.282  For example, Clear Channel has used its 
resources to create a $10,000 digital automation system called 
“Prophet,” which has revolutionized radio.283  The software allows 
 
273 Howard, supra note 119, at 280 (arguing that absentee owners are motivated by 
money and uninterested in preserving localism). 
274 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). 
275 See Knoll, supra note 164 (“In a number of large to medium-sized markets around 
the country, a single owner may control from three to five stations.”). 
276 Id. 
277 Howard, supra note 119, at 280. 
278 Id. 
279 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Fritts) (stating that “the 1996 
Telecommunications Act enabled radio to better serve local audiences across the country 
as well as strengthening the industry economically”). 
280 See Knoll, supra note 164. 
281 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Fritts). 
282 See Randy Dotinga, ‘Good Mornin’ (Your Town Here)’, Wired News, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,54037,00.html (Aug. 6, 2002). 
283 Id. 
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disc jockeys to voice track their shows.284  They spend a few 
minutes recording introductions and other sound bites, and a 
computer merges those sounds with songs, promotional spots, 
sound effects, and commercials to create the show.285 
Voice-tracking creates tighter operations.286  The biggest 
benefit of voice-tracking, according to proponents, is that it brings 
big-city disc jockey talent to smaller markets that otherwise would 
not be able to afford it.287  Programming recorded in Los Angeles 
is exported to smaller markets throughout the nation as a series of 
taped moments that are spliced together to sound as if the disc 
jockeys were broadcasting locally.288  Producers edit segments to 
create the appearance of disc jockeys taking live requests and calls 
from listeners, even recording half of a conversation with which a 
live, local disc jockey can interact.289  There are some drawbacks, 
such as when Florida’s attorney general fined Clear Channel 
$80,000 for misleading listeners into thinking that a national 
contest was local, partly since the company dubbed a local disc 
jockey’s voice into an interview with a winner.290 
Although voice-tracking techniques and syndication may give 
small market listeners otherwise unattainable disc jockeys and 
morning shows, many argue that “the local part of local radio” 
suffers.291  If the show is taped, a listener cannot call a favorite disc 
 
284 Id. 
285 Id.  “Thanks to advances in audio technology and pioneering work by Clear Channel 
Communications, an epidemic of digital fakery has struck the radio industry.  Only the 
listeners are live and local at many radio stations, and Clear Channel is gambling that 
nobody will notice.  Or care.” Id. 
286 Id. 
287 See Leeds, supra note 15.  For example, listeners in small markets can hear Rick 
Dees joking about their local news or Sean Valentine promoting local concerts. Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id.  Another disadvantage of running a station on autopilot is slow response time. See 
Dotinga, supra note 282.  For example, on September 11, 2001, it took four hours for a 
group of automated Clear Channel stations in Harrisonburg, Virginia to stop playing 
music and start broadcasting news. See id.  Apparently, the employees “couldn’t figure 
out how to do anything because they had so few people in that building.” Id. 
291 Polly Higgins & Oscar Abeyta, Tuscon Radio Making Waves: Corporate Radio 
Roves In, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 3, 2002, at 1A (commenting that “your favorite morning 
team with whom you take that cup of coffee or drive to work may not be as close as you 
think”). 
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jockey and make a request.292  Also, local appearances are at a 
minimum, if at all.293  Moreover, the technological efficiencies 
have severely affected the institution of nighttime disc jockeys.294  
In San Diego, the nation’s seventeenth-largest market, only two 
local after-midnight hosts remain.295 
Moreover, some worry that “formats will serve the most 
profitable demographics only and that syndicated programming 
will become a cost-saving mainstay, prompting a decline in 
localization.”296  There is no doubt that consolidation has resulted 
in innovative technology aimed at streamlining operations, and that 
syndication can bring otherwise unattainable popular programs to 
small communities.  For listeners who value news and talent with 
local relevance, however, deregulation of ownership restrictions 
has not served their interests. 
D. Private Interests Versus Public Interests 
Consolidation of radio ownership allows conglomerates to 
benefit from economies of scale.297  The private economic interests 
of radio owners, however, should be subordinate to the public 
interest of promoting competition, diversity, and localism in the 
marketplace.298  Thus, benefits to private interests should not be 
gained at the expense of the public interest. 
Large-scale radio owners benefit from operational efficiencies, 
such as sharing management, production, and programming 
personnel.299  Additionally, advertising, promotions, and technical 
 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
294 Id.  Many stations record evening and overnight shifts, allowing voice-tracking to cut 
and paste voices with songs. Id. 
295 Dotinga, supra note 282. 
296 Howard, supra note 119, at 280 (quoting Chuck Taylor, Westinghouse, Infinity 
Merger Fuels Consolidation Concerns, BILLBOARD, July 6, 1996). 
297 As a firm grows larger, it can consolidate its resources to operate more efficiently 
than smaller firms. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text. 
298 The licensee is merely a fiduciary for the public. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right 
of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); see also supra notes 85–89 and 
accompanying text. 
299 Ekelund, supra note 118, at 158. 
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facilities can be combined to decrease operational costs.300  
Proponents of deregulation argue that these efficiencies resulting 
from consolidation are passed on to the consumer.301 
According to Lowry Mays, the chairman and chief financial 
officer of Clear Channel, in testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Clear 
Channel takes advantage of economy of scale throughout the 
country, reinvesting savings into stations, improving technical 
facilities, and increasing the quality of local programming.302  In 
Syracuse, New York, Clear Channel saves nearly $200,000 per 
year by operating its stations as a unit instead of standalone 
properties.303  It has reinvested those savings in the local stations, 
upgrading a transmitter, installing new studio equipment, and 
increasing local news programming.304 
The efficiencies found in an economy of scale are in stark 
contrast to the state of radio in the early 1990s, when sixty percent 
of stations were losing money.305  Competition from cable and 
broadcast television helped to send AM station profits plummeting 
fifty percent in 1989 and 1990, while FM station profits fell thirty-
three percent.306  With consolidation and streamlining of 
operations, stations have become more profitable.307 
On November 18, 2002, however, the Future of Music 
Coalition released a report that, among other things, purported to 
dispel claims that consolidation is necessary for economic viability 
of the radio industry.308  The report used “power ratio” as a type of 
profitability measure, dividing a station’s revenue share by its 
 
300 Id. 
301 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Fritts). 
306 Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays). 
307 See Higgins & Abeyta, supra note 291 (“But some people worry that too much 
power is being put in too few hands, and that radio listeners’ needs are being put behind 
the needs of corporate profits.”). 
308 FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 192.  The study maintains that the rapid 
consolidation of radio following the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has resulted in a 
loss of localism, less competition, fewer viewpoints, and less diversity in radio 
programming. Id. 
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audience share.309  The formula revealed little relationship between 
the amount of stations owned and the power ratio.310  Parent 
companies owning fewer than 50 stations perform similarly to 
those owning more than 100, according to the report.311  The 
authors of the report note that the data ideal for analysis—radio 
companies’ internal financial and operations data—is not publicly 
available.312 
Whether or not consolidation has led to economic efficiencies, 
many argue that the FCC must weigh any potential efficiencies 
against the fundamental need to promote the public interest.313  
Accordingly, regardless of the theoretical validity of economic 
arguments, the policy goals themselves—of ensuring competition, 
diversity, and localism in the marketplace—are worth pursuing 
through regulation.314  After all, they argue, the Communications 
Act of 1934 created a fiduciary relationship between the licensed 
radio stations and the public.315  As the Court in Red Lion 
Broadcasting stated, “It is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”316 
Consolidation may lead to economic benefits through the 
efficiencies of economies of scale and scope.  The efficiency 
theory, however, seems to place the private interests of 
broadcasters above the public interest.  Economic efficiency that 
benefits the station owners is a valid goal, as long as it is not at the 
expense of the public interest.  The rights of the listeners trump the 
rights of the broadcasters. 
 
309 Id. at 30. 
310 Id. at 31. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 30. 
313 See Letter from Mike DeWine & Herb Kohl, U.S. Senators, Subcommittee on 
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, to Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC (Jan. 28, 
2003) (voicing concern about any significant relaxation in media ownership rules the 
FCC might be considering), available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/issues/-
mediaownership/dewine_kohl.doc (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
314 See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 21. 
315 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 389 
(1969) (upholding regulations requiring radio stations to provide time for a response to a 
personal attack). 
316 Id. at 390. 
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IV. OWNERSHIP REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED TO REVIVE 
COMPETITION, DIVERSITY, AND LOCALISM 
Congress deregulated the radio industry with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to encourage “diversity of media 
voices, vigorous economic competition” and to promote “the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity.”317  Today, as the radio 
industry contends with monopolistic behavior, decreased diversity, 
and indifference toward localism, it becomes clear that 
deregulating ownership restrictions failed to achieve the goals 
stated in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.318  The current 
marketplace does not provide a sufficient level of competition to 
protect and advance the goals of competition, diversity, and 
localism in the market. 
The driving force behind deregulation of ownership restrictions 
is the marketplace theory, which speculates that competition 
compels radio firms to create diverse programming in order to 
reach and serve various listening groups.319  The fundamental 
assumption underlying the marketplace theory is the existence of 
sufficient competition in the market.320  Unfortunately, this 
assumption cannot be applied to the current radio marketplace, 
where excessive ownership consolidation has created an anti-
competitive environment.321  Insufficient competition sabotages 
the marketplace theory and its promise of increased diversity and 
localism. 
The radio marketplace is highly concentrated, with the two 
largest radio entities reaching over 160 million listeners and 
pulling in over 45 percent of nationwide advertising revenue.322  
This immense size and influence facilitates anti-competitive 
behavior, as radio stations pressure record labels and artists to pay 
for airtime and exposure.323  Although pay-for-play existed before 
 
317 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 257, 110 Stat. 56, 77 
(1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). 
318 See supra notes 165–296 and accompanying text. 
319 See supra notes 121–49 and accompanying text. 
320 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
321 See supra notes 180–97 and accompanying text. 
322 See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text. 
323 See supra notes 198–223 and accompanying text. 
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deregulation, recent massive consolidation has raised prices for 
payoffs and reduced alternative options.324  Consequently, small 
record labels and new and independent artists are squeezed out, 
reducing the potential diversity of the airwaves.325 
The largest radio owner—and frequent target of deregulation 
critics—is Clear Channel, with over 1,200 stations nationwide.326  
Clear Channel enjoys a 27 percent listener share of 103.4 million 
listeners, while netting 27.5 percent of the nationwide advertising 
revenue.327  Clear Channel is just as influential in related markets, 
maintaining the status as the nation’s largest live entertainment 
company and the biggest outdoor advertising company.328  Along 
with Clear Channel’s size comes the incentive to use its clout to 
raise revenue.329  Accordingly, industry insiders charge the 
conglomerate with numerous monopolistic abuses, from driving 
smaller companies out of business to strong-arming artists to 
perform with the company’s promotional arm.330 
In addition to nationwide radio consolidation that has led to 
anti-competitive behavior, the radio marketplace has seen a 
decrease in programming diversity and a forfeiture of localism.  
Playlists and news are streamlined, formats overlap, and small 
market stations lose their local identity.331  Moreover, due to lack 
of competition in the marketplace, stations are not seeking out 
specific niche markets to gain the greatest audience share.332  
Rather, there is a reduction of classical and jazz formats causing 
those listeners to turn to the Internet.333 
Despite adversely affecting competition, diversity, and 
localism, consolidation has led to valuable operational 
efficiencies.334  Streamlining many departments, voice-tracking, 
 
324 See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text. 
325 See supra notes 208–23 and accompanying text. 
326 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. 
329 See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text. 
330 See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text. 
331 See supra Part III.B. 
332 See supra notes 262–69 and accompanying text. 
333 See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text. 
334 See supra Part II.B. 
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and syndication save money and bring smaller markets talent they 
may otherwise miss.335  Furthermore, large radio entities have 
more financial capital to reinvest in local stations and markets than 
small owners.336 Clearly, the public interests of promoting 
competition, diversity, and localism outweigh any benefits of cost-
cutting efficiencies.337  The benefits of consolidation, however, 
cannot be ignored. 
Deregulation is not wrong.  Many smaller stations were losing 
money, and many smaller news departments were in danger of 
being eliminated when the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
opened the doors for large-scale consolidation.338  Operational 
efficiencies can benefit both owners and listeners.339  The 
marketplace theory is not wrong.  In a marketplace of sufficient 
competition, the public will choose what is in the public interest by 
voting with their radio dials.340 
The damage to the radio marketplace occurred because 
Congress excessively deregulated, spoiling the opportunity to 
create a marketplace of sufficient competition.  Changing the 
nationwide ownership cap from forty stations to unlimited was 
reckless.  The marketplace theory never had a chance to work, as a 
few corporations with sufficient capital began to rapidly 
consolidate and left the competition in their wake.341  The resulting 
marketplace is devoid of sufficient competition and fails to 
promote diversity and localism. 
To infuse sufficient competition into the marketplace, Congress 
and the FCC must consider implementing regulations limiting 
ownership.  Congress and the FCC must reevaluate ownership 
regulations within the marketplace, balancing the public interests 
of promoting competition, diversity, and localism with 
consolidation efficiencies.  There is a middle ground, where the 
marketplace can benefit from efficiencies associated with 
 
335 See supra notes 283–90 and accompanying text. 
336 See supra notes 279–82 and accompanying text. 
337 See supra notes 313–16 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra notes 305–07 and accompanying text. 
339 See supra Part II.B. 
340 See supra Part II.A. 
341 See id. 
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consolidation, without sacrificing competition, diversity, and 
localism.  Congress and the FCC must determine whether a 
national ownership limit would create competition sufficient to 
give the marketplace theory a chance to work, resulting in 
increased diversity and a renewed commitment to localism. 
CONCLUSION 
Clear Channel and other radio conglomerates may not be as 
evil as they are often portrayed,342 but they certainly make 
deregulation look bad.  The massive consolidation of radio has 
stifled competition, decreased programming diversity, and hurt 
localism in many markets.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
intended to promote competition through deregulation, but it 
overreached by completely eliminating the national ownership cap.  
New ownership restrictions are required to create sufficient 
competition in the radio marketplace and promote the public 
interest. 
 
 
342 “The evil intentions attributed to Clear Channel are not true at all,” declared Randy 
Michaels, former chief executive officer of Clear Channel radio operations. Randy 
Dotinga, Murky Water for Clear Channel, Wired News, at http://www.wired.com-
/news/business/0,1367,54038,00.html (Aug. 7, 2002). 
